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OPINION* 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Jace Clendinen appeals from a jury verdict that found him guilty of violating 18 
U.S.C. § 922(k).  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly 
summarize the essential facts.   
 On September 1, 2014, Virgin Islands police officers seized a firearm in 
Clendinen’s possession during a celebration called J’ouvert in the Smith Bay area of St. 
Thomas.  Clendinen was indicted on November 6, 2014 on one count of possession of a 
firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).   
Trial commenced on February 9, 2015.  During voir dire, the District Court asked 
the panel of prospective jurors a number of questions regarding their knowledge of and 
relationship to the attorneys, witnesses, and defendant in the case.  The District Court 
also asked the prospective jurors, “Have you, a close friend or a family member been 
involved in the criminal justice system, either as a victim, a defendant or a witness?”  
Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 53.   
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Clendinen’s counsel requested that the District Court ask the venire panel whether 
“anyone on the jury ha[s] any extreme problem with firearms.”  J.A. 86.  Clendinen’s 
counsel had previously submitted a similar voir dire question in writing.  J.A. 13 (“8. The 
evidence in this case will reference firearms.  Do any of you have such strong opinions 
for, or against guns that you would not be able to be a fair and impartial juror in this 
case?”).  The District Court declined to ask that question, noting that its previous 
questions “adequately screen[ed]” the panel.  J.A. 86–87.   
The District Court next asked the prospective jurors whether any of them had read 
or heard anything regarding Clendinen’s firearms charge.  Prospective Juror 62 answered 
yes.  At sidebar, the prospective juror explained that she recognized the defendant’s last 
name but could not remember details.  The prospective juror added, “But if it regards a 
firearm, I have had six friends murdered here, and I don’t think I’m very impartial when 
it comes to firearms.”1  J.A. 87–89.  When the judge asked Prospective Juror 62 whether 
she would be able to follow the judge’s instructions on the law, the juror replied, “I’m not 
sure if I could if it involves an unlicensed firearm.”  J.A. 89–90.  Prospective Juror 62 
was struck from the jury.  After the jury was sworn in, the District Court gave 
preliminary instructions that the jurors must “follow that law whether you agree with it or 
not.”  J.A. 101.  
 At trial, the jurors heard testimony from six members of the Virgin Islands Police 
Department, one officer from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 
                                              
1 Prospective Juror 62 had not answered “yes” to the District Court’s previous question 
about friends or family being the victim of a crime.  
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Clendinen, and two of Clendinen’s companions at the J’ouvert celebration.  The District 
Court instructed the jury both before and after the attorneys’ closing statements.  In the 
charge to the jury before the closings, the District Court stated: 
Before we have closing arguments, however, there is one instruction that I 
wanted to read to you.  I may have left out a line or two, and so I want to 
make sure that we cover all bases with that.  
 
The terms “know,” “knew,” “knowingly” as used in these instructions 
describe the state of mind of the defendant. Those terms mean that the 
defendant was conscious and aware of the defendant’s actions.  
 
Whether or not a defendant had this knowledge is a question of fact to be 
determined by you on the basis of all the evidence.  An act is done 
knowingly only if it is done purposely and deliberately, and not because of 
accident, mistake, negligence, good faith or other innocent reason. You can 
consider any statements made and acts done or omitted by a defendant as 
well as other facts, inferences and circumstances in evidence which indicate 
the defendant acted knowingly. 
 
J.A. 303–04.   
In jury instructions provided after closing statements, the District Court stated,  
 
You are to perform this duty [to try the issues of fact] without bias, 
sympathy or prejudice.  Under no circumstances, then, may your 
deliberations be affected or diverted by any appeals to bias, passion, or 
prejudice, nor influenced by any pity or sympathy in favor of either side . . . 
. [I]t is your duty to give an absolutely fair and impartial verdict.  
 
J.A. 341–42.   
 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Clendinen.  He timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 48 U.S.C. § 1612 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Clendinen’s challenges on 
appeal stem from the voir dire and jury instructions given at trial.  “We review the district 
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court’s conduct of voir dire for abuse of discretion.”  Butler v. City of Camden, City Hall, 
352 F.3d 811, 814 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003).  “We exercise plenary review in determining 
‘whether the jury instructions stated the proper legal standard.’  We review the refusal to 
give a particular instruction or the wording of instructions for abuse of discretion.  
Finally, ‘when we consider jury instructions we consider the totality of the instructions 
and not a particular sentence or paragraph in isolation.’”  United States v. Leahy, 445 
F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d 
Cir. 1995)). 
III. 
A. 
 Clendinen contends that the District Court erred by failing to ask prospective 
jurors his proposed voir dire Question 8 regarding whether any of them harbored strong 
opinions about firearms.  He argues that the failure to ask the question impeded his right 
to an impartial jury and his counsel’s ability to exercise peremptory challenges. 
 District courts have “wide discretion . . . in . . . areas of inquiry that might tend to 
show juror bias.”  Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991).  “[A]n abuse of 
discretion will only be found where the district court’s voir dire examination is ‘so 
general that it does not adequately probe the possibility of prejudice.’”  Butler, 352 F.3d 
at 815 (quoting Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1993)).  “Generally, a district 
judge need not pursue any specific line of questioning on voir dire.”  Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 
710.   
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We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask 
Clendinen’s specific proposed question regarding biases about firearms.  While such a 
question may have elicited more information about jurors, we are also mindful that trial 
judges cannot reasonably cover every theoretical inquiry and that voir dire is not 
limitless.  See United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 360–61 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that 
there is “never a perfect . . . scenario” in voir dire).  Here, the District Court already 
inquired as to prospective jurors’ experiences with the criminal justice system, including 
being a victim or witness of a crime or having close friends or family members who were 
victims or witnesses.  The District Court also inquired as to the prospective jurors’ 
knowledge of the firearms charge against Clendinen.  Thus, we do not find that it was an 
abuse of discretion for the District Court to decline to ask an additional question as to 
“strong opinions for, or against guns.”2  J.A. 86–87.   
Moreover, Clendinen has not demonstrated that any alleged harm suffered as a 
result of inadequate voir dire was prejudicial in light of the District Court’s instructions to 
the jury during the trial, including the jury charge.  Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 
                                              
2 Clendinen makes much of the fact that Prospective Juror 62 alerted the District Court to 
her own biases about firearms because six of her friends had been murdered.  While we 
do not know why Prospective Juror 62 did not speak up when asked about friends who 
were victims of a crime, the fact that she eventually disclosed bias about firearms does 
not mean the judge should have asked an additional question to other prospective jurors.  
By determining that questions posed to the venire panel had already “adequately 
screen[ed]” for bias related to firearms, the District Court made its “own evaluations of 
demeanor evidence and of responses to questions.”  Butler v. City of Camden, City Hall, 
352 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 
188–89 (1981)).  Based on the record before us, we decline to disturb that determination. 
The Court does note that providing prospective jurors with information about the criminal 
charges at the outset of voir dire may help contextualize their answers to questions about 
their ability to be impartial. 
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U.S. 182, 190 (1981) (noting that “substantial indications of the likelihood” of bias are 
required to find constitutional error).  First, Clendinen “does not attempt to suggest that 
any particular juror was biased.”  Jones, 566 F.3d at 360–61.  Second, even if any 
empaneled juror had prior beliefs as to the possession of firearms, Clendinen does not 
explain how such a belief would impair the juror’s ability to consider Clendinen’s 
culpability impartially.  Clendinen’s defense did not depend on any opinion “for or 
against guns.”  Instead, his defense was that he was a “good Samaritan” who picked up 
the gun in order to return it to the police to prevent it from getting into the wrong hands.  
In rendering a verdict against him, the jury determined that this was not true.  It is not 
clear how such a verdict would have been biased by any unexpressed opinions as to gun 
ownership.  Third, the District Court provided additional instructions to the jury to refrain 
from making judgments based on personal feelings, telling jurors that they must “follow 
the law whether you agree with it or not,” J.A. 101, and that jurors have a duty to proceed 
“without bias, sympathy or prejudice,” J.A. 341.  “Jurors are presumed to follow the 
instructions they are given.”  United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 299 (3d Cir. 2014).  
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in declining to ask the defense’s proposed voir dire Question 8. 
B. 
Clendinen also contends that the District Court erred by failing to instruct the jury 
on the defense of justification and by failing to give a standalone instruction on good 
faith.  We disagree. 
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An instruction on the defense of justification is only appropriate if there is 
evidence adduced at trial that the defendant 
(1) . . . was under unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily 
injury; 
(2) . . . did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be 
forced to engage in criminal conduct; 
(3) . . . had no reasonable legal alternative (to both the criminal act and the 
avoidance of the threatened harm); and 
(4) there is a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the 
avoidance of the threatened harm. 
 
United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. 
Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 540 (3d Cir. 1991)).  There was no evidence that Clendinen was 
“under unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury,” id., when he 
possessed the gun with an obliterated serial number.  Rather, the account of events as 
described by Clendinen himself was that he was at a festival with friends when he found 
the gun on the ground.  J.A. 242.  When asked whether he had any concern for his safety 
at that time, Clendinen replied that he “was hoping no one saw me.”  J.A. 242.  Even 
taking Clendinen’s claim as true — that he was waiting to “safely and privately give the 
weapon to law enforcement,” Clendinen Br. 13 — such a defense is not one of 
justification because there is no evidence that any perceived threat to his safety was from 
an unlawful source or was a threat of death or serious bodily injury.  In the absence of 
any evidence supporting a justification defense, the District Court did not err in declining 
to instruct the jury on that defense. 
 Clendinen’s contention that the District Court erred by declining to give a 
standalone instruction on good faith is also without merit.  In evaluating jury instructions, 
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we look to the “totality of the instructions.”  Leahy, 445 F.3d at 642 (quoting Coyle, 63 
F.3d at 1245).  Here, the District Court instructed the jury on good faith.  It stated: 
Whether or not a defendant had this knowledge is a question of fact to be 
determined by you on the basis of all the evidence.  An act is done 
knowingly if and only if it is done purposely and deliberately, and not 
because of accident, mistake, negligence, good faith or other innocent 
reason. 
 
J.A. 304.  We see no deficiency in discussing the good faith defense in the context of the 
knowledge requirement and conclude that the decision not to issue a standalone 
instruction on good faith was not an abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Gross, 961 
F.2d 1097, 1103 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that because “a jury finding of good faith is 
inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully . . .  failure to 
give the instruction on the good faith defense did not constitute an abuse of discretion” 
when the court gave “a detailed instruction on the elements of the crime,” including 
knowledge and willfulness). 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction. 
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